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Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The Role of TV News

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# Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions

## THE ROLE OF TV NEWS

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Increasing evidence of connections between public opinion and U.S. foreign policy-making suggests the importance of determining what influences shape the collective foreign policy preferences of the public. A data set involving repeated measures of public opinion and content analyses of TV news broadcasts before and between opinion surveys is used to estimate the impact of news stories from various sources on opinion. Reported statements and actions by media commentators, allegedly nonpartisan "experts," opposition party figures, and popular (but not *unpopular*) presidents have the largest estimated effects, while the impact of other sources is negligible. Despite ideas about the "two presidencies" and the like, the process of shaping opinion on foreign policy does not appear substantially different from that affecting domestic policy preferences. Some implications for the democratic control of foreign policy are discussed.

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Public opinion, long thought to be largely irrelevant to foreign policy decision making, is now increasingly viewed as a significant factor in the making of American foreign policy (see Russett 1990). A number of case studies have established its role in particular policy areas such as U.S. relations with China (Kusnitz 1984) and arms control issues (Graham 1989). Analyses of aggregate data have indicated that foreign policies correspond with what a majority of Americans favors in more than 90% of the cases examined (Monroe 1979), and that changes in collective public opinion are followed by congruent changes in policy about two thirds of the time (more often still, when opinion changes are large and sustained; Page and Shapiro 1983, 178, 181).<sup>1</sup>

1. The 66% congruence between opinion and policy that Page and Shapiro found on 231 foreign and domestic cases (those in which some policy change could be measured) broke down to 70% congruence on domestic issues and 62% on foreign, but this difference is not statistically significant. It appears to result from the greater difficulty of measuring small changes in foreign policy (Page and Shapiro 1983, 182).

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We doubt that these studies will constitute the final word on the subject, because of the great difficulty in untangling the extent of reciprocal processes: the effects of policy on opinion, for example, or officials' efforts to educate or manipulate the public. (See, however, the multivariate time series analysis in Hartley and Russett 1990.) But the close connections between opinion and policy indicate, at minimum, that collective public opinion concerning foreign policy is sufficiently important to justify studying the origins and dynamics of opinion. What factors shape the foreign policy opinions of the American public? How do those factors resemble or differ from those affecting domestic opinions?

Quite a bit is known, theoretically and empirically, about the dynamics of public opinion generally. The media, for example, play a central role; the old notion of "minimal effects" is dead. The contents of the mass media affect not only agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Kinder 1987), but also attributions of responsibility (Iyengar 1991) and policy preferences (Fan 1988; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987). Moreover, a great deal is known about what characteristics of sources, messages, and audiences affect persuasive success: the credibility of the source, for example; the clarity and unambiguous directionality of the message; and the audience's extent of exposure and its predisposition to acceptance.

For analysis of U.S. foreign policy, it is important to know how, in concrete terms, these principles translate into persuasive success or failure by particular kinds of political actors. Is it the case, for example, that American presidents and their administrations are able to persuade the public to alter its preferences about foreign policy? Do presidents regularly "prepare" public opinion to accept policies they plan to pursue anyhow? Such opinion leadership (which would throw a different light on findings of opinion-policy congruence) seems particularly plausible given the low visibility and technical complexity of much of foreign policy, and given the executive branch's commanding position in control of information.

What about other domestic political figures, such as leaders of the opposition party? Is their impact muted on foreign matters, where presidents are said to be sovereign? How about U.S. interest groups; to what extent do they affect opinion on issues beyond the water's edge?

Statements by experts and media commentators, as reported on network television news, have been found to have substantial impact on the public's policy preferences generally (Page et al. 1987, 31). Is their influence even greater on matters of foreign policy, where citizens' personal experience offers less guidance and where expert help may be more welcome?

Finally, what are the effects of news from abroad: news of international events and of statements and actions from foreign sources? Is U.S. public

opinion primarily event driven? Can it be swayed by persuasive foreign leaders?

## DATA AND METHODS

We have addressed these questions by drawing foreign and defense policy cases from an available data set concerning changes in policy preferences and the contents of network television news. These data, which lump together domestic and foreign issues, have not previously been analyzed for differences between the two.<sup>2</sup>

Our 32 foreign policy cases are listed in the Appendix. Each involves a national survey question that was repeated in identical form within a few weeks or months, as well as news content variables drawn from analysis of the Vanderbilt TV news summaries. Data collection began with the first Vanderbilt summaries (1969) and ended in the early 1980s, so the cases do not cover all possible foreign policy issues or all time periods. But they do touch on a wide range of important issues, with particular emphasis on the Vietnam War, Middle East oil and Arab-Israeli conflicts, arms control (SALT II) and military spending, and U.S.-Soviet relations. They also include the Panama Canal Treaties, Cuba, Henry Kissinger's role as Secretary of State, political contributions abroad, and the military draft.

Our main dependent variable is the percentage point change, if any, in collective public opinion on each policy: the extent and direction of change in the proportion of Americans favoring a prominent policy alternative, between two surveys (roughly 2 or 3 months apart) in which an identical policy preference question was repeated. This variable can take on positive values (if a higher percentage of people supported the policy in the second survey than in the first), or negative values (if a lower percentage did), or zero (if there was no change). About half our cases involve significant—6 percentage points or greater—changes in opinion, and half do not.

The independent variables are drawn from content analysis of TV news between pairs of surveys on each policy, plus separate analysis of TV news in the 2 months before the first (T1) survey. The news from one network (randomly chosen each day)<sup>3</sup> was coded on every broadcast day over roughly 5 months for each of the 32 cases.

2. We are grateful to the National Science Foundation (grant # SES 83-08767) for its support of the original data collection, which involved 29 research assistants and more than 10,000 person-hours of work. See Page et al. (1987) for a fuller description of the original data and Jordan (1991) for more details on the present analysis.

3. On some days all three networks were coded in order to permit checking for differences among networks. In those cases, all news stories are included in the analysis but weighted by 1/3.

Nine separate sources of foreign policy news were distinguished: (1) the president; (2) his administration and fellow partisans in Congress; (3) the opposition party; (4) interest groups (including demonstrations); (5) experts or research studies; (6) network commentators, or reporters or anchor people when editorializing; (7) events that could not be attributed to named actors; (8) foreign sources from countries considered friendly under current U.S. policy; and (9) foreign sources considered unfriendly. (Courts and judges, included in the domestic data, were excluded here because they had virtually nothing to say about foreign policy.)

News was broken down into source-stories, that is, segments of a story attributable to one of these distinct sources. Each source-story was coded on a 5-point scale (+2 to -2) according to its directional thrust with respect to the policy in question: whether it was *definitely favorable* to the policy, *probably favorable*, *neutral* or *unclear*, *probably unfavorable*, or *definitely unfavorable*. For each of the 32 cases, these pro-con codes for all the stories from each source were added over the whole period between T1 and T2 surveys, to yield a net measure of how favorable or unfavorable toward the policy that particular source was. The same thing was done for each source on each policy case for the 2-month period before the first survey (pre-T1).

The result was 18 news content variables: a sum of pro-con source stories from each of the 9 sources before the first survey (pre-T1), and a sum for each of the 9 sources between the first and second surveys (T1-T2).<sup>4</sup>

Our analytic technique is ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. In order to avoid an arbitrary assumption about the autoregressive nature of public opinion (namely that in a regression of the opinion level at time T2 on opinion at T1, the coefficient is exactly 1.00), we performed a full regression in which the dependent variable was actually the level of opinion at T2, with the level of opinion at T1 included as an independent variable along with the news variables. Because T1 opinion in that analysis had a very large coefficient (.88), the coefficients on the news variables turned out to be very similar to those in a regression in which opinion change was the dependent variable (i.e., when T1 opinion was subtracted from both sides of the equation). We will focus on the full regression.

What we did, in short, was try to predict the amount and direction of changes in public opinion, across our 32 cases, using a set of source-specific news variables drawn from network television news broadcast at the time of each of the cases.

4. Other measures were calculated, including the *average* extent of pro or con thrust from each source, but the sums—which allow for cumulative impact by multiple stories—proved to be better predictors of opinion change. Only clearly relevant stories are included in this analysis; the inclusion of peripherally relevant stories dilutes the findings.

## RESULTS

First a word about the frequency of news from various sources. As Table 1 indicates, the president—and even more so administration officials and fellow partisans—had loud voices in TV broadcasts of foreign policy news. Together they accounted for 47% of all the source-stories, nearly half, compared with only 14% for the opposition party. This is consistent with the familiar finding in communications research that official sources tend to dominate the news (Sigal 1973; Gans 1979; Bennett 1988). If anything, the administration in Washington seems to have a bigger edge concerning foreign policy news than domestic.

Stories from foreign countries, especially “friendly” ones, were also quite numerous. So were news stories from interest groups, which evidently did not confine themselves to domestic matters.<sup>5</sup> Events proved to be a meager category; most TV news reports about foreign policy events involved either statements or actions from foreign countries (i.e., “foreign” sources), or reactions to events by the administration, the opposition, and the like. Stories from experts and media commentary were infrequent, but we will see that each such story was rather potent.

How much effect on opinion did all these news stories have? Our regression analysis predicting the level of public opinion at T2, by means of opinion at T1 plus the news before T1 and news between T1 and T2, is reported in Table 2. This regression is notable, first of all, for its great success: going by the adjusted  $R^2$ , some 89% of the variance in levels of public opinion is accounted for. Such high  $R^2$ s are not common in dealing with survey data, even aggregate survey data of the sort used here, because of unavoidable sampling error in surveys. One could hardly hope to do better.

To be sure, much of the success in predicting the percentage of the public favoring a particular policy comes from using as an independent variable the percentage favoring that same policy in an earlier survey. Opinion at T1 has a large and highly significant coefficient, 0.88. Substantively, this means there is considerable *inertia* in public opinion about foreign policy;<sup>6</sup> it tends to be highly stable and to stay at about the same level unless something disturbs it.

That something, our analysis indicates, is TV news. When we subtracted the T1 level of opinion from both sides of the equation and predicted the

5. As Danelian (1989) indicates, however, only a skewed subset of interest group voices is heard in media reports about foreign policy. In the present data, several demonstrations (mostly against the Vietnam War) are included within the “interest group” category.

6. We cannot be sure of the precise extent of this inertia effect because of possible bias in estimating the coefficient for the lagged endogenous variable.

TABLE 1  
Frequencies of Foreign Policy News Items by Source

<i>News Source</i>	<i>Frequency of Source-Stories</i>	
	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>n</i>
President	13.9	368
Administration	33.0	873
Opposition party	13.6	360
Interest groups	12.0	317
Events	1.5	39
Commentary	3.3	86
Experts	1.2	31
Foreign, friendly	15.5	410
Foreign, unfriendly	6.2	163
Total	100.0	2,647

extent and direction of opinion *change*, using only the TV news variables, we still accounted for a very substantial proportion of the variance:  $R^2 = .73$ ; adjusted  $R^2 = .36$ . (Bear in mind that sampling error in the original surveys limits the amount of variance that is explicable: this is considerably more true with respect to opinion changes than levels of opinion.)<sup>7</sup> The news that appears on television substantially affects collective public opinion.

It is also clear, however, from the two columns of news variable coefficients in Table 2, that news from different *sources* has substantially different effects. These unstandardized coefficients can be interpreted in terms of the number of percentage points of opinion change between T1 and T2 that is produced by net total of a single "probably favorable" story (coded +1.0) from the particular source.

The first column, of "pre-T1" (before the first survey) TV news variables, is included chiefly to provide statistical controls, but it has some substantive meaning as well. The negative coefficients—especially on variables that have substantial positive coefficients in the second column—indicate what can be called a "falling off" effect. Pre-T1 news has already affected the baseline level of opinion at the time of the first survey (T1). If part of that effect is temporary, then—controlling for later influences—one would ex-

7. Error variance is probably a high proportion of the total variance in observed short-term opinion changes. Most polling organizations claim that marginal frequencies in their surveys are accurate within 3 percentage points at the .05 confidence level; our observations of changes from one survey to the next average only 5.9 percentage points (in absolute value). A far smaller proportion of variance in observed opinion *levels* can be attributed to measurement error.

TABLE 2  
Effects of TV News from Different Sources

	<i>Pre-T1 News</i>	<i>News Between T1 and T2</i>
News source		
President	-0.75 (0.90)	0.09 (0.44)
Administration	0.57 (0.68)	0.18 (0.21)
Opposition party	-2.49** (0.87)	1.05 (0.56)
Interest groups	0.22 (0.53)	-0.20 (-0.40)
Events	2.29 (2.74)	2.38 (3.49)
Commentary	-0.56 (2.87)	5.81** (1.75)
Experts	-3.30 (3.42)	5.35 (3.53)
Foreign friendly	1.12 (1.32)	-1.03 (1.01)
Foreign unfriendly	0.44 (1.03)	0.10 (0.84)
Other variables		
Public opinion at T1	0.88** (0.10)	
Constant	3.38 (5.48)	
	$R^2 = .96$ adjusted $R^2 = .89$ $N = 32$	

NOTE: Entries are unstandardized (*b*) coefficients from regressing the level of opinion at T2 on opinion at T1 and the sums of relevant pro-con news story scores from various sources, before T1 and between T1 and T2 surveys, for all 32 cases. Standard errors for *bs* are given in parentheses.

\*Significant at .05 level or better by two-tailed test; \*\*significant at .01 level or better by two-tailed test.

pect opinion to fall back toward its earlier state by T2, producing a negative relationship between opinion change and the news that had had a positive effect at T1.<sup>8</sup>

8. In an ideal world with perfect measurement, the pre-T1 and T1-T2 coefficients for each news source might be opposite in sign but exactly equal in magnitude, *if* for all sources the same proportion of the effect on opinion was temporary and if it decayed at the same rate. But here measurement is not perfect (especially because of the uniform 2-month measurement of pre-T1 news as contrasted with the variable T1-T2 periods), and there is no particular reason to expect all sources to have effects that are identical in form. Hence the absence of mirror-image coefficients. But the pattern of opposite signs is clear.

We should focus, however, on the more easily comprehended coefficients in the second column, which indicate how much impact news from each source *between* the two surveys had on changes in opinion from the first survey to the second.

It is immediately evident from the second column of Table 2 that news commentary, from anchorpersons, reporters in the field, or special commentators, had a very large effect on public opinion about foreign policy. A single "probably favorable" story is estimated to produce nearly 6 percentage points of opinion change. This figure (which differs significantly from zero at the .01 level even with our relatively small number of cases and large number of independent variables) is very substantial indeed, especially considering the general stability of collective policy preferences. It suggests that the news media themselves may play an active role in shaping Americans' opinions about foreign policy.

News from experts or research studies is estimated to have almost as great an impact: a single probably favorable story produced, on the average, over 5 percentage points of opinion change. This coefficient did not reach statistical significance at the .05 level according to our conservative two-tailed test,<sup>9</sup> but it closely resembles an estimate of expert effects using the larger data set of domestic and foreign issues taken together (Page et al. 1987, 30). This suggests that the public is acceptant of TV-provided expertise in dealing with the complexities of foreign affairs.

News from the opposition party is also estimated to have a substantial positive effect, although we cannot quite be confident of it at the .05 probability level. Presumably, opposition leaders are serious figures who have some bipartisan credibility and can move public opinion their way, particularly when they are relatively popular compared with the president.<sup>10</sup>

What, then, about the president and his administration, which we might expect to be major leaders of public opinion? They turn out, in Table 2, to have estimated effects that are very small and far from statistical significance. This may seem at first to be incredible, suggesting a statistical anomaly, but the mystery is easily cleared up.

9. It satisfies a one-tailed test, which might be more appropriate, given that there is no theoretical reason to expect experts to have a perverse (negative) impact in which opinion moved in the opposite direction from whatever experts said. The expert coefficient was significant at the .02 level in the regression with opinion change rather than opinion level as dependent variable.

10. One would expect the opposition party (and the president and administration as well) to have stronger effects on the opinions of their fellow partisans and independents than on members of the other party, but we cannot disaggregate the data to test these hypotheses.

The opposition party's positive impact may have resulted in part from the unpopularity, during many of our cases, of the incumbent Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter.

In the first place, the very small (.09) positive coefficient for presidents represents an average figure, which combines the effects of some popular presidents with those of some very unpopular ones. In about half our cases, in fact (15 of the 32), the president at that time was unpopular, with a Gallup approval rating below 50%. Little wonder if unpopular presidents did not sway the public.

Previous research with data combining domestic and foreign policy cases has indicated that popular presidents in fact have substantial effects on public opinion, whereas unpopular presidents have virtually no effect at all (Page et al. 1987, 33-34; Page and Shapiro 1984). Our own pursuit of this theme was inhibited by the small number of foreign policy cases, but, when we analyzed them separately for popular and unpopular presidents, we found positive coefficients for the popular presidents and small or even negative coefficients for the unpopular.<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, we have been talking about a particular concept of "effect," namely the impact of a single news story. But we saw in Table 1 that the frequencies of stories from different sources varied enormously, with far more coming from the president and his administration than from experts or commentators. Many news stories, each having a small effect, could add up to something big. That appears to be the case with the president and the administration.<sup>12</sup> The "bully pulpit" may not usually permit a president to create a big swing in public opinion by giving a single speech, but a popular president, hammering away on a chosen foreign policy issue with a number of speeches and actions, can hope to make a significant difference. A 5 or 10

11. Independent variables had to be dropped in order to achieve the necessary degrees of freedom. When only pre-T1 and T1-T2 presidents, administration, commentary, experts, and foreign (friendly) news variables were included, for example, popular presidents had very significantly positive estimated effects ( $b = 4.21$ ;  $t = 3.37$ ), whereas unpopular presidents had nonsignificantly negative ones ( $b = -1.12$ ;  $t = -.79$ ). But the coefficients in these analyses were unstable, varying markedly according to which variables were excluded. Thus we cannot be sure about the relative impact of popular and unpopular presidents, or about possible interactions between presidential popularity and the impact of other news sources.

12. Taking the coefficients in Table 2 as the best available estimates of the impact of a single story from each news source, we multiplied them by the net number of pro or con stories from that source for each particular case, yielding an estimate of the total impact on opinion by that source in that case. We then added up the absolute values of each source's total impacts, over all the cases, to produce a measure for each news source of its total impact on opinion over our whole set of cases.

According to this method the President and administration each had a total impact of 39 percentage points of opinion change over all 32 cases, not far below the 62 percentage point impact of experts or the 90 points of commentary, and well above interest groups, events, and unfriendly foreign sources. But two results (a very large, 102-point total impact by the opposition party, and a large and strangely *negative* [-81] total effect of friendly foreign sources) offer a reminder that some of the nonsignificant coefficients are unstable and may confuse such an analysis.

percentage point change in collective policy preferences may be a reasonable goal for an active, popular president.<sup>13</sup>

As Table 2 indicates, news about unattributed, unmediated events did not, in itself, have an appreciable effect on public opinion. This finding must be taken with caution, however. It certainly does not mean that the public ignores major international happenings. "Events" as measured in these data are a residual category after all statements and actions by identifiable human actors were attributed to those actors; the leftovers include only such things as natural disasters or the actions of unidentified terrorists. Most of what we would ordinarily think of as international events are encompassed in announcements, assertions, actions, or interpretations by identifiable news sources. The fact that news from those sources largely accounts for opinion changes, however, indicates that events probably have most of their effects indirectly, mediated through the reactions and interpretations of U.S. leaders as transmitted by the mass media. Events may not speak for themselves; the American public appears to rely on its own trusted leaders for interpretations.

The data also indicate that interest groups and demonstrations do not have any appreciable net impact on Americans' opinions about foreign policy—at least not any direct effect through their own overt statements and actions. Interest groups' money, of course, may have indirect effects through politicians to whom they contribute, or through experts they subsidize. And it is possible that popular and unpopular interest groups have distinct effects. But the data do not permit exploration of those possibilities.

Foreign news sources, too, have no appreciable direct effects on U.S. public opinion. (There is a puzzling though nonsignificant tendency for sources from friendly countries actually to have a negative impact.) Most Americans apparently pay attention to their own commentators, experts, and political leaders, discounting the views of foreigners. There have no doubt been exceptions to this rule—Winston Churchill comes to mind—but not enough exceptions to show up in our data.

## DISCUSSION

This analysis indicates that public opinion concerning foreign policy is rather stable. The percentage of the population supporting a particular policy

13. Presidents can also move public opinion by controlling events. Actions in dealing with (or creating) a foreign policy crisis, if successful and not contested by opposing elites, can not only produce a "rally" in presidential popularity (see Brody 1984), but can also probably alter policy preferences through media-transmitted reactions and interpretations by commentators and experts. Moreover, with their easy access to the media, presidents may be able to set the agenda and the terms of debate.

at a given time is a strong predictor of the percentage supporting it at a later time (Shapiro and Page 1989, offer additional evidence of foreign policy opinion stability).

When collective opinion does move, the news that is broadcast on network television accounts for a large part of the magnitude and direction of change. But the source of news makes a great deal of difference. A single story from a news commentator or an expert is estimated to have a very large positive effect. Opposition parties appear to have a positive impact. Each story from a president or his administration has only a very small, insignificant positive effect, but popular presidents probably do better, and the large number of executive-branch news stories may add up to a substantial total impact over time. Unmediated events, interest groups, and foreign news sources have little or no direct effect on opinion.

With minor exceptions, this picture is rather similar to what has emerged from analyses of domestic and foreign policy cases taken together. Contrary to many expectations, and despite talk of "two presidencies" and the like, there does not seem to be anything particularly unique about the way the public responds to messages about foreign policy.

One could take these findings in either an optimistic or a pessimistic spirit. They suggest that the public cannot easily be pushed around by any particular source — presidents, for example, have only limited effects and must compete with other news sources to guide the public. The apparent impact of the opposition party suggests that some political pluralism is at work. (To be sure, the sheer volume of news from the executive branch far outweighs that from the opposition in Congress or elsewhere.) Strong effects by commentators and experts are compatible with a picture of a public that engages in collective deliberation and takes expertise seriously. The minuscule direct impact of narrow interest groups fits this same picture.

On the other hand, one might argue that the potency of media commentators and of ostensibly nonpartisan TV "experts" is disturbing. Who elected them to shape our views of the world? Who says they are insightful or even unbiased? Further, the apparent impotence of interest groups when they speak out in public may conceal indirect effects through politicians to whom they contribute money, experts they subsidize, or media they own or influence. The fact is that our findings are compatible with some very different views of how American politics works.

A number of questions remain. We would like to know, for example, exactly who these TV experts and commentators are, who selects them, and by what criteria. Do they represent market-oriented efforts to give the public the kind of help it wants? Are they exemplars of an objective quest for

knowledge? Do they pass on policy statements from relatively autonomous media? Or do they reflect some sort of interest group influence or elite consensus?<sup>14</sup>

Similar questions concern what causes presidents, administrations, and opposition parties to advocate the stands they do. Anticipation of the public's will? The wishes of party activists? Interest groups or elites associated with the parties? Their own sense of what democratic statesmanship requires?

In short, the causal structure of the processes that underlie these proximate influences on public opinion remains very much open to question and in need of research. So do issues about the quality of information that is being conveyed by these news sources. Is it accurate, helpful, complete? Or erroneous, misleading, one-sided? Do any systematic biases creep into news sources' positions or into the ways in which sources are selected and presented by the media? These questions are important to any assessment of the democratic conduct of foreign policy.

14. Soley (1989) has found that television experts in the late years of the Reagan administration tended to represent a rather narrow set of views (mostly conservative), and were frequently affiliated with a few conservative think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

APPENDIX: List of Cases

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Opinion Change</i>	<i>Survey Origin</i>	<i>Dates</i>
Vietnam troop withdrawals even if South Vietnam collapses	+13.4%	Harris	10/69 4/70
Better relations with Arabs for oil even if it means supporting Israel less	+10.2	Harris	12/74 3/75
Vietnam War morally wrong; get out as soon as possible	-6.0	Harris	10/69 12/69
Coalition government in Saigon to include communists if that is the only way to get peace	-1.5	Harris	8/72 10/72
Cannot leave until insurance of South Vietnam's independence	+4.3	Harris	10/69 12/69
Agreement between Russia and the United States to settle Middle East problem	-8.6	Harris	6/71 2/72
Tough laws versus illegal corporate contributions at home or abroad	-1.0	Harris	8/76 10/76
Get Arab oil by stopping military aid to Israel	-8.5	Harris	12/74 3/75
Too much tax money to military for defense	-7.6	Harris	5/74 1/75
Immediate cease fire in Vietnam, holding ground now occupied	-5.9	Harris	10/69 12/69
Increase government spending for military defense	+0.9	NYT/CBS	4/76 6/76
Increase federal spending on military and defense	-7.8	NYT/CBS	1/81 4/81
Use nonmilitary (economic) weapons on Iran	-6.0	NYT/CBS	1/80 4/80
Replace Kissinger as Secretary of State	+0.7	NYT/CBS	5/76 6/76
Pay more attention to Arab demands (need oil) even if antagonize Israel	+7.0	NYT/CBS	10/77 4/78
Send troops to protect our oil in Mideast if threatened	-3.8	NYT/CBS	2/80 3/80
Participate in '80 Olympics in Moscow even if Soviets stay in Afghanistan	+1.3	NYT/CBS	2/80 4/80
Treaties giving Panama control of canal in year 2000	-0.9	NYT/CBS	10/77 1/78
Not be so friendly with Russia due to getting less than giving	-1.2	NYT/CBS	4/76 6/76
Relax tensions with Russia	-10.2	NYT/CBS	5/82 9/82
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II)	-19.4	NYT/CBS	6/79 11/79
Embargo grain to Russia	-1.3	LA Times	11/80 4/81

## APPENDIX: Continued

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Opinion Change</i>	<i>Survey Origin</i>	<i>Dates</i>
SALT II nuclear weapons agreement	+2.1	LA Times	11/80 4/81
Bring home all troops from Vietnam before end of year	-6.6	Gallup	1/71 2/71
Withdraw all our troops from Vietnam immediately	-9.6	Gallup	6/69 11/69
Reduce, month by month, number of U.S. troops in Vietnam	+4.0	Gallup	1/69 6/69
After troop withdrawal, continue military aid to South Vietnam	-15.1	Gallup	7/72 12/72
Return to military draft at this time	+0.9	Gallup	2/80 7/80
Diplomatic recognition of Cuba by the U.S.	-14.6	NBC	4/77 6/77
U.S.-Russia agreement to limit nuclear weapons	-5.5	NBC	2/79 3/79
Freeze production of nuclear weapons by U.S. and Russia	-0.6	NBC	6/82 10/82
Send AWACS advanced radar planes to Saudi Arabia	+7.5	NBC	9/81 10/81

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